INTRODUCTION
In 1930, an imprisoned Antonio Gramsci wrote with regard to the 'crisis of authority' which befell European polities at the end of World War One : '[t]he crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. ' 1 In these lines, one easily comes to grips with a fundamental self-reflection of the troubled times following the Great War. If nowadays this epoch stays under the aegis of upheaval, emergency and radical shifts in the ways of understanding politics and society, it is also imagined as being marked by the two cataclysms which chronologically limit it.
Thus, this age is now retrospectively conceived as being the interbellum to such an extent that the fundamental distinctive trait one relates with this time is the experience of war.
However, for Gramsci, the question at stake in the European crisis is that of authority which is somehow suspended between the old and the new. The interwar was understood by its contemporaries as interregnum, as a space and time between two distinct regimes of power. And, according to his reading, it is this very transition which conjures strange political forms and phenomena in the life of power.
As Roger Griffin observes, the interwar is marked by the general belief […] that Western history was itself at a turning point from which it could either collapse into terminal barbarism and anarchy amidst social breakdown and war, or give birth to a new type of society beyond the current age of chaos and decadence.
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The interwar is caught by an 'ethos of crisis', 3 it calls for 'palingenetic rebirth'. 4 It wants both to accelerate time and to suspend it. It disdains history and still wants to engage in historical endeavours. It enacts both fantasies of radical change and returns to embellished forms of the past. In this way it exposes the divisions and paradoxes of modernity itself. For inasmuch as modernity brings into the fore the question of anomie and alienation, it also tries to create its own 'panacea'. . Thus the law is redeemed of its lifeless normative existence, inasmuch as 'the exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state's authority' 7 .
apparatuses of the state of exception as a paradigm of government'. 10 The results of these practices would prove themselves disastrous, for what is questioned through the state of exception is the very possibility of law to articulate itself and to be distinguishable from mere assertions of power. In this sense, the state of exception appears as a return of anomie in the very mechanism of the law: '[s]ince "there is no rule that is applicable to chaos", chaos must first be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, chaos and the normal situation -the state of exception'.
the Code in the historical moment of its enactment, and the effacement of classical forms of legality determined by the Code's ideological appropriation. Consequently, this chapter engages with the historical situation of Romanian criminal law by placing it in a broader socio-political context marked by the rise of fascism as well as with the theoretical aspects of its ideological appropriation. Moreover, it tackles the question of continuity between democratic legislation and authoritarian law.
As a traditional repository of state's internal sovereignty and the most perceptible site of state's repressive powers, criminal law played a central role in the reconstruction of state power in its dialectics of reception and opposition to fascist ideology. Given that at the level of criminal legislation one can grasp the values founding the normative order that it aims to protect, I seek to bring to light the ambiguities at the core of the conservative authoritarian project of containing fascism through legal means which were already impregnated by this ideology.
In order to analyse this issue, I will try to approach the relation between text and context, while drawing on the Foucauldian concept of archaeology as an attempt at linking the semiotic to the semantic. 12 Following this line of argument, my aim is to examine some of the basic discursive formations of Romanian legal order of the time which find themselves at the core of the process of the dissolution of legality, namely the category of crimes against the constitutional form of the state.
12 'Archaeology (…) does not imply the search of a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence: of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation (…) to which it belongs': Michel Foucault dimension of the external and internal threat of bolshevism. As Romanian authorities recalled with regard this issue,
[Bolsheviks] treated our country and especially Bessarabia with the outmost attention. There they made strong efforts to provoke the revolt of the population against the Romanian regime, taking advantage of all the animosities, of all the asperities and of all the conflicts of the first years of transition following the union. 23 These major dynamics did not fail to affect significantly the life of the polity, rendering the interwar perhaps one of the most politically charged timeframes in the basic habits of politics were altered, as the secular trend toward liberal democracy and greater representative government was challenged and in some areas reversed. The consequence was a brutalization of political life which made the recourse to political violence seem natural and even normal.
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Political uncertainty would be furthered by a series of public scandals related to Prince Carol's estrangement from his wife. As a result, the royal heir was forced to sign his abdication in early 1926 at the insistence of the leader of the NLP, Ion I. C.
Brătianu. Within its structure he established a network of radical groups named the Brotherhoods of the cross. 72 In the subsequent period, the militancy of the ultranationalist group took the form of social activism devised in building a direct relationship with its potential constituency.
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The paramilitary style and radical stand of the nascent movement did not pass unnoticed by the state's authorities. It was thus opened the series of conflicts with the state, the ultranationalists shifting from a vigilante organisation operating against international communism, to an insurrectional group aiming for a political takeover. As early as 1923, the core members of the future Legion were arrested on suspicion of plotting the assassination of NLP members of government. They were acquitted on the ground that the legislation of the time did not criminalise preparatory acts to a crime, but only attempts. 74 During the proceedings, one of the leaders, Ion Moța, shot his former fellow, Ion Vernichescu who had been exposed as an informant. Moța was acquitted for having acted in self-defense.
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The movement's political activism took the peculiar populist form of organizing work camps and thus allegedly addressing in a non-mediated manner 70 Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right above 266. 71 Ibid. 72 Mann, Fascists above 265. 73 Haynes, 'Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian "New Man"' above 176. 74 Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right above 266. 75 Ibid. In response to the fascists' rise to power and after an abortive attempt to gain control over it, King Carol II tried to completely suppress the Legion. However this move was rather directed by realpolitik interests than by ideological creeds. In devising their reaction, not only did the defenders of the status quo employ tactics and ideological tropes present in the Legion's ideology, but they also built a new regime of legality for the state-sanctioned violence. It is these legal and historical dynamics that I wish to further explore in relation to the enactment of the At first glance, these articles appear to be closely linked not only through their mere proximity in the Code's structure, but moreover in the way they build the symbolic core of the State that is to be protected. One cannot fail to grasp the emphasis put by the authors of the Code on the need to protect the constitutional order in its monarchical guise as well as in its statist stand. The text also appears to be devised as a response to social dissent which the framers originally understood as being provoked mainly by communist and socialist agitation. Moreover, following a classical distinction between the formal constitution and the material structure of the state, the Code stands for the defence of the overall social status quo, in both its economic and purely social form, to which article 209 bears witness. Accordingly, these articles tend to protect the constitution in its totality and distinguish themselves as a strategy of repression aimed at preventing radical political upheaval. 123 The author considers the definition of political crimes to be 'so uncertain in scientific terms' : Ionescu-Dolj, 'Origina textului' above 83.
conceptual core. Thus, by an exclusion of the 'political' signification of such acts with respect to the constitutional order, the limits of the political sphere itself are constructed.
What one witnesses here is not only a form of raising statist defences against political competitors who risk undermining the state apparatus, but also an inscription of politics in the sphere of the law. Politics is going to be henceforth a dimension which can be subjected to regulations and can be understood as a domain of application or of investment for various repressive strategies. In order to grasp the ambiguity of the signifier "political" in the framework of the criminal legislation of the time, it should be noted that other crimes, such as electoral offenses and some press offenses, may benefit from the alleviated legal treatment determined by their political character. In this sense, political agency as well as political subjectivity is to be recognized as a determinant factor in perpetrating a crime inasmuch as it does not aim to destabilize and counter the constitutional discourse itself.
If article 207 -labelled 'undermining the constitutional order' -reiterates to some extent article 78 from the 1864 Code, it also tries to individualize the object of the offense (constitutional foundations, order of succession, etc.). Moreover, it introduces a qualification for the material element of the offense, which is the perpetration of acts 'through violence'. As the authoritative commentator on the article states, the introduction of this clause was needed in order to 'defend the State . At the time of its drafting, the latter did not fail to spark controversy, inasmuch as it also punished preparatory measures to these actions. It introduced a break with the interpretive doctrine set up by the 1864 Code which criminalized only actual attempts and acts. Thus, the act of conspiring against the social order had been termed as being an 'exceptional felony,' 127 which was enforced in consideration of the 'higher interest of the state.' 128 While in both forms the statement appears neutral, being directed against any political faction, the preliminary works in the drafting cannot be more specific about the enemy to be repressed. As such, the legal prescription was to serve as a security measure against 'revolutionary communism', which 'represents nowadays the most serious threat to international public order.' The interpretation of these legal provisions takes place in a specific legal culture and inside a more encompassing legal framework, which determines the ways in which meaning is stabilized. As such, it is important to stress that modern law operates through a process of reducing complexity and thus limiting the floating of signification. 130 In Luhmann's words 'law needs to be as predictable as possible or an instrument whose effects should be calculated in advance'. 131 In our case, whereas criminal law-specific doctrines of interpretation and commentaries on the Criminal
Code offer a limit to the plurality of meanings, this formal limitation is not allencompassing. Core concepts such as state and constitutional organisation are to be sought at the level of legal theory or state theory, which offers the rational façade of legal interpretation as well as the ideological justifications for the interpreters'
choices. This is the reason why, before critically engaging with the statements enclosed in articles 207-211, in an attempt to render them meaningful for a thorough analysis of law and fascism, it is important to take into account the specific characteristics of Romanian legal thought of the time. point, articles 207-211 are equally attempting to contain both communist and fascist activism and to affirm the full authority of the Sovereign who will ultimately suspend all traditional legal protections.
To be sure, the pre-eminence of the executive, as well as the practice of governing by decree were not new forms in the exercise of power in Romanian politics, as the appeal to the 'higher interest of the State', the recourse to emergency and exceptional measures were marks of legal life all through the interwar period. However, one would be wrong in understanding the overarching royal dictatorship only as mere attempt to prevent fascist upheaval. In many respects, the 167 Carol regime and its preceding authoritarianism is not only complacent or complicit in fascist ideology and its overtones, but also structurally close. 171 171 Also a historian such as Vlad Georgescu may think otherwise : 'The royal dictatorship was not, however, a fascist or Nazi regime. It was only moderately nationalistic and anti-Semitic': Ibid. Whilst Carol II himself wasn't overtly anti-Semitic, the first steps of the future anti-Semitic legislation date from the beginnings of the royal dictatorship under the cabinet Goga. 
